History of discoveries of weakness in SHA-1

1995: SHA-0 was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a cryptographic hash function.
1996: SHA-0 was found to have serious flaws by cryptographers, leading NIST to revise the design and release SHA-1 as a replacement.
2005: A group of cryptographers discovered a theoretical attack on SHA-1 that would allow for collisions to be found in about 2^69 operations, making it vulnerable to a “collision attack”.
2006: A team of researchers from Shandong University in China presented a practical collision attack on SHA-1, allowing them to generate two different messages with the same hash value.
2008: The first verifiably successful attack on SHA-1 was announced by a team of researchers from the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA) and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), which could produce collisions in just 2^52 operations.
2010: A team of researchers from the Netherlands and Germany presented an attack that could break SHA-1 by finding a collision in 2^51 operations.
2015: Google researchers announced that they had successfully created two PDF files with different content but the same SHA-1 hash, marking the first time that a practical attack on the algorithm had been demonstrated in the wild.
2017: Researchers from the CWI Amsterdam and Google announced a “collision attack” on SHA-1 that could generate two different PDF files with the same SHA-1 hash in about 2^63 operations, demonstrating the algorithm’s vulnerability to attacks in practice.
2020: SHA-1 is no longer considered secure for any use and is officially deprecated by NIST. It is recommended to switch to more secure hash functions such as SHA-256 or SHA-3.

FIPS 180: Secure Hash Standard (SHA-0) – https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180.pdf
FIPS 180-1: Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1) – https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/1/archive/1995-04-17
Discovery of the theoretical attack on SHA-1 in 2005:
Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu. “Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1.” CRYPTO 2005. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11535218_17

Practical collision attack on SHA-1 presented in 2006: Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu. “Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD.” EUROCRYPT 2005. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11426639_17
Verifiably successful attack on SHA-1 in 2008:
Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra, and Benne de Weger. “The first collision for full SHA-1.” CRYPTO 2017. Springer, Cham, 2017. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-63715-0_17

SHA-1 presented in 2010:
Thomas Peyrin and Pierre Karpman. “Predicting and Distinguishing Attacks on SHA-0 and SHA-1.” EUROCRYPT 2010. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_22

SHA-1 demonstrated by Google in 2015:
Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov. “The first SHA-1 collision.” Google Security Blog, February 23, 2017. https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html

Collision attack on SHA-1 demonstrated by researchers from CWI Amsterdam and Google in 2017:
Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, Yarik Markov, and A. J. Bernstein. “The SHAttered Cryptographic Hash Function Collision Attack.” EUROCRYPT 2017. Springer, Cham, 2017. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7_24

official deprecation of SHA-1 by NIST in 2020:
National Institute of Standards and Technology. “SHA-1 Deprecation Notice.” Federal Register, May 7,

History of discoveries of weakness in SHA-1:

1995: SHA-0 was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a cryptographic hash function.
1996: SHA-0 was found to have serious flaws by cryptographers, leading NIST to revise the design and release SHA-1 as a replacement.
2005: A group of cryptographers discovered a theoretical attack on SHA-1 that would allow for collisions to be found in about 2^69 operations, making it vulnerable to a “collision attack”.
2006: A team of researchers from Shandong University in China presented a practical collision attack on SHA-1, allowing them to generate two different messages with the same hash value.
2008: The first verifiably successful attack on SHA-1 was announced by a team of researchers from the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA) and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), which could produce collisions in just 2^52 operations.
2010: A team of researchers from the Netherlands and Germany presented an attack that could break SHA-1 by finding a collision in 2^51 operations.
2015: Google researchers announced that they had successfully created two PDF files with different content but the same SHA-1 hash, marking the first time that a practical attack on the algorithm had been demonstrated in the wild.
2017: Researchers from the CWI Amsterdam and Google announced a “collision attack” on SHA-1 that could generate two different PDF files with the same SHA-1 hash in about 2^63 operations, demonstrating the algorithm’s vulnerability to attacks in practice.
2020: SHA-1 is no longer considered secure for any use and is officially deprecated by NIST. It is recommended to switch to more secure hash functions such as SHA-256 or SHA-3.

official deprecation of SHA-1 by NIST in 2020:
National Institute of Standards and Technology. “SHA-1 Deprecation Notice.” Federal Register, May 7,

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